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## Selected Issues for Discussion 14 March 1977

- General course of PRM 11 and John McMahon's opening remarks
- Tentative Report Outline
- The IC Requirements Process as it affects tasking and operations: How good or bad is it?
- The IC Requirements Process as it affects Planning, Programming, R&D, and Budgeting: How good or bad is it?
- Is there a meaningful distinction between national, departmental, and tactical intelligence? Or are we really only talking about who owns what assets?
- How should one describe the relationship of foreign service reporting to intelligence?

## Meeting on PRM 11, Task 2 14 March 1977

Opening Remarks by John McMahon

- This is a "pre-working group" meeting. This group has no formal standing until the DCI has met with the SCC subcommittee on 17 March. We called it because time is short and we had to get the process moving.
- PRM 11 has three parts. First two lead into the third. A.G. has legal aspects. DCI is charged to review and assess his own role and responsibilities. These two reports will be the basis for part 3 where the full SCC will frame options and make recommendations to the President.
- We've got one month till 15 April to do the report on Task 2. Almost anyone here could do a fair report in a week on the DCI's comunity role and its problems. But this report must reflect the views and experiences of more than any one actor. Therefore, we need a flexible way to smoke out community views and to bring them together.
- We see this operation on three levels.
  - -- The SCC subcommittee is the formal mechanism. It contains the DCI and representatives of the SECDEF, Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor. They will guide the effort and review the report before handing it over to the SCC.
  - -- Then we shall have a flexible working group at the level of this meeting. Its composition will vary depending on the issue. Its real job will be to argue out the main issues of the report and see that all views are aired. We don't expect to task this group to write parts of the report. We do want people at this level to review the report.

 The actual writing will be done by a team on
staff made up of
and perhaps one other. We
believe keeping the drafting group small and tight
will permit earlier drafts for wider comment.

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- We see the community role of the DCI as the main (not only) issue of PRM 11 as a whole. We know that President Carter and the NSC see it this way too.
- This PRM is about missions and structure. Therefore it is about bureaucratic turf. We could spill a lot of blook on this PRM. But we should keep these points in mind:
  - -- From what we've seen of President Carter, those he sees as part of the problem he is unlikely to make part of the solution.
  - -- Task 2 is supposed to define and analyze problems, not lay out solutions. That we ought to be able to do without a lot of conflict.
  - -- The DCI's people are not out to grab more power for the DCI as their objective. CIA, for example, tends to see the DCI's community role as overshadowing his attention to CIA.
  - -- People on the IC Staff may have various riews on how this ought to come out. The only thing we are committed to from the start is this: The DCI's obligations and his powers should balance out. If the President and the Congress look to him to do something, he should have the power to do it.